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Abstract: In this essay, we demonstrate how rhetorical analyses of 
style can maintain their focus on linguistic patterns while 
simultaneously attending to material ones. Focusing on the trope of 
metonymy and the figures of incrementum and epistrophe, we 
show how these devices represent different modes of material-
semiotic addressivity, resiliently turning and reconfiguring the 
rhetorical ecologies they capacitate. Using three case studies—a 
corpus of news articles about water quality amid extensive wind 
turbine development in Chatham-Kent, Ontario; traditional and 
“rogue” pain scales; and scientific literature about CRISPR—we 
explore the stylistic affordances of epistrophe, incrementum, and 
metonymy, showing how these “turnings” allow resilient material-
semiotic articulations. We conclude by suggesting how our 
framework may be applied and extended to other topics and how 
this understanding of tropes and figures may align with other 
research trajectories in RSTM. 
 
Keywords: style; rhetoric of science; tropes; figures; rhetorical 
ecology 
Introduction  
Scholarship on tropes and figures in ARSTM tends to fall (loosely) 
into two camps. In the first camp, we might identify foundational 
work by Jeanne Fahnestock, Ken Baake, Elizabeth Shea, Randy 
Harris, and many others, all of whom have called attention to the 
fundamental work tropes and figures perform in scientific 
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discourse. These figures do persuasive work, of course, but these 
scholars have shown that they do much more than that by offering 
inventional resources for scientific thought (or, in Harris’ view, all 
thought) or by epitomizing arguments (Fahnestock). In their view, 
tropes and figures are ubiquitous as patterns and forms, and we can 
recognize them at work in almost any linguistic domain. 
In the second group, we might place scholars invested in new 
materialist interpretations, who focus on tropes as a productive way 
to develop notions of ecological relationality that bear theoretical 
similarities to Nathan Stormer and Bridie McGreavey’s work on 
resilience. These scholars note that the term “trope” derives from 
the Greek τροπή, meaning “turn” or “change,” an etymology shared 
by scientific terms that index material, ecological relations such as 
“heliotrope” (Muckelbauer, 2016), “tropic,” and “trophic” 
(Druschke, 2019; Keeling & Prairie, 2018). Among them, John 
Muckelbauer argues for a post-human rhetorical theory centered 
around the concept of trope as an affective mode of material 
relationality and change (Muckelbauer, 2016, p. 40). Building on 
Muckelbauer’s work, Thomas Rickert suggests that a theory of 
tropological “turning” helps trace how organisms rhetorically turn 
to and turn with other organisms (Walsh et al., 2017, p. 453). In a 
similar vein, Diane Keeling and Jennifer Prairie (2018) use the 
concept of tropological “turning” to identify a kind of rhetorical 
engagement that, like resilience, places critical emphasis on 
rhetorical addressivity, affectivity, and responsivity. They argue 
that “different modes of response...are indicative of different 
tropes,” and so “the ways organisms interact with each other and 
their environments are tropic” (Keeling & Prairie, 2018, p. 47). 
These scholars shift our understanding beyond words alone to 
consider tropes as rhetorical modes of engagement and 
transformation. 
This outline may suggest two irreconcilable approaches to 
understanding tropes and figures. However, the camps we just set 
up are not so neatly divided. Indeed, one can see this more 
traditional scholarship on tropes and figures as tracing language’s 
resilient stylistic capacities for rearticulating natural and 
technological phenomena in ways that suasively attune audiences, 
arguments, and inventions. Charles Bazerman, for instance, 
showed how verbal and material floral metaphors were used to 
market early electric light fixtures in ways that resiliently turned 
two otherwise distinct discourses—the new discourse of electric 
innovation and the traditional discourse of feminine domesticity—
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towards a more attuned articulation (1999, pp. 313-326). Similarly, 
in Rhetorical Figures in Science, Fahnestock (2002) identifies 
figures as resilient visual-material devices that range from 
Faraday’s “elector-magnetic rotation apparatus,” a visual (and 
material) antimetabole (p. 147), to the visual antithesis in Darwin’s 
depictions of dogs’ opposite postures in The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals (p. 67). Moreover, in his recent 
work on cognitive rhetoric, Harris posits a different kind of material 
resiliency, suggesting that rhetorical figures are cognitive patterns 
that can be repurposed across situations but that nonetheless 
constitute durable “grooves of the mind” (2013, p. 4). Figurative 
structures persist because they attune both neuro-anatomic 
materiality and linguistic rhetorical arrangements. 
Meanwhile, those espousing materialist approaches do not intend 
to set aside linguistic creativity but to identify the discursive 
transformations that occur as material assemblages evolve and 
intra-act. If, as Keeling and Prairie put it, different tropes are 
indicative of different modes of affective engagement and change, 
then rhetorical analyses versed in tropes and figures can help 
specify different material-semiotic transformations. For instance, 
Scott Graham (2015) argues that metaphor, metonymy, and 
synecdoche, respectively, characterize increasingly tight material- 
semiotic couplings between medical technologies and the images 
they produce. For instance, he notes that early x-ray technology was 
described metaphorically, as a type of lantern, in a way that did not 
yet couple the x-ray with its characteristic image. Later, however, 
technologies such as CT scans were represented metonymically as 
agents able to “take pictures,” which represents a tighter coupling 
between the technology and its image (Graham, 2015, p. 134). 
In what follows, we demonstrate how rhetorical analyses of style 
can maintain their focus on linguistic patterns while simultaneously 
attending to material ones. Focusing on the trope of metonymy and 
the figures of incrementum and epistrophe, we show how these 
devices represent different modes of material-semiotic addressivity, 
resiliently turning and reconfiguring the rhetorical ecologies they 
capacitate. Detailing the stylistic affordances of incrementum, 
epistrophe, and metonymy, we show how these “turnings” enable 
resilient material-semiotic articulations. To study rhetoric in this 
way is to explore how materiality is marked and animated by 
stylistic transformations, evolutions which rhetorical analysis is 
well-prepared to investigate. Stylistic devices can attune, turn, and 
change the ambient rhetorical environment, often in ways that 
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allow rhetors to become more engaged in discourses that might 
otherwise exclude them, their motivations, and their arguments. 
Epistrophe 
Schemes of repetition allow for adaptation and stability, for the new 
to arise out of the old or traditional, and for mobile rhetorical 
assemblages that can respond flexibly to changing situations. In her 
work on style, Jeanne Fahnestock (2011) positions figures of 
repetition, including epistrophe, among figures of argument—that 
is, figures for which “the very form of a statement, its grammatical 
arrangement, was considered to carry meaning itself” (p. 223). In 
particular, the figure of epistrophe, or repeated end units in 
successive clauses or sentences, follows the trend of other figures 
using parallelism that “equalizes or coordinates content, and this 
equalizing can have persuasive consequences as listeners and 
readers ‘consume’ statements formed into smaller units” 
(Fahnestock, 2011, p. 224). In what follows we demonstrate how to 
understand epistrophe as a resilient rhetorical force, coordinating 
and ordering what might otherwise seem like disparate, 
disconnected events within a community. 
We use a case study of controversies surrounding water quality 
amid extensive wind turbine development in Chatham-Kent, 
Ontario, a traditionally agricultural community that has recently 
become home to hundreds of wind turbines. Farmers initially 
signed up to place turbines on their farmland, attracted by the 
promise of money in exchange for use of just a small portion of 
their land. Soon, though, rural folks started noticing changes in 
their well water. As more turbines were introduced, their water got 
cloudy, full of dark particles that, in some cases, made their water 
undrinkable and unusable. Concerned residents founded Water 
Wells First (WWF), an organization seeking to advocate for those 
who say their water has been damaged by the wind turbines. 
According to WWF, the vibrations from pile driving turbine bases 
deep into the ground disrupt the Kettle Point black shale bedrock 
beneath and, they say, may destroy the underground aquifer upon 
which rural citizens depend for their water. To determine how 
discourse about this event functions, this analysis draws on a 
corpus of news articles about this issue between 2016 and 2019. 
Here, we present instances of how epistrophe occurred across this 
archive to support the claim that wind turbines had caused the 
water quality problems. 
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Schemes of repetition occur regularly in newspaper accounts in 
which WWF representatives and local community members speak 
about the water quality problems they face. Within a given article, 
they often appear when speakers wish to emphasize a point about 
the effects of wind turbine development on their wells. Here are just 
a few examples from news articles that are textbook instances of 
schemes of repetition, such as this quote from a homeowner who 
says her well was damaged: “Mais c’est bizarre: mon puits est 
perdu, le puits voisin est perdu, le puits sur l’autre concession 
est perdu. Tout est perdu depuis qu’ils ont commencé avec 
North Wind” (“But it’s odd: my well is lost, the neighboring well is 
lost, the well on the other concession is lost. All is lost since they 
started with North Wind”) (qtd. in Pham & Lefevre, 2017). In this 
passage, the speaker employs epistrophe (repetition of the last 
words in a clause) across three connected clauses and then repeats 
the clause “est perdu” at the beginning of the next sentence. These 
sentences link three different events, syntactically and logically 
under the final repetition, “tout est perdu” (“all is lost”). This links 
disparate events under a shared grammatical structure and, by 
implication, a causal one as well. In other words, the grammatical 
structure of the sentence reinforces its logical structure. It is worth 
noting that the first sentence in the quote also employs 
epanaphora, repetition of a beginning clause, since each one begins 
with “le puits” (“the well”). Through these two schemes of 
repetition, epistrophe and epanaphora, what might be seen as 
three disconnected events—three wells going bad—is turned, 
rhetorically, into a single phenomenon. This rhetorical connection 
is important because rural community members could not establish 
a scientific connection between these events in a way that was 
persuasive to the municipal government. 
We see a similar structure in this example from a letter to the 
editor published in Farmer’s Forum: “The first five turbines built in 
Dover affected water wells; the next 35 affected more water 
wells. The next in Chatham township affected water wells. If 
you keep doing the same thing can you expect different results?” 
(Hensel, 2018). Here, the speaker relies once again on three clauses 
or sentences linked epistrophically, focusing on different sets of 
wind turbines that “affected water wells.” Here again, disparate 
events become linked logically by the grammatical structure, and 
the final sentence reinforces that argument (in this case with a 
rhetorical question). Fahnestock explains that parallelism 
(especially when combined with strategic repetition) often supports 
inductive arguments (2011, p. 227). Both examples discussed thus 
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far rely on the repetition of an event—the poisoning of wells—that 
occurs in physical space as well as inductive reasoning wherein 
these repeated events lead to a conclusion or generalization. These 
examples coincide with the initial stage of WWF’s advocacy, which 
involved raising awareness of the affected wells and seeking 
answers about how they had become contaminated. 
Facing an uphill battle, rhetorically, WWF members and their 
allies continued to argue epistrophically, turning the discourse 
affectively as well as logically. Increasingly, rural community 
members became distrustful as the municipal and corporate 
officials placed the burden of proof on WWF to show that water 
well quality was affected by wind turbines and not simply a random 
set of occurrences due to the ages of the wells or poor maintenance. 
The following two quotations use a similar tripartite structure to 
the examples above, only here the epistrophe emphasizes an 
ambivalent sense that something harmful is happening and no one 
knows why: 
● “I think we have to take some very strong action here because we 
don’t know what is going on. At best, all we know is that 
something seems to be going on, and the people in Chatham-
Kent with water wells need to know what is going on” 
(Corcoran, 2017 August). 
● “People are worried about their health and they are worried 
about their property valuation and people are worried about 
water. We have to protect the water security of Chatham-Kent” 
(Corcoran, 2017 September) 
In each of these cases, the repeated terms, “what is going on” or 
“are worried,” invoke an unknowable crisis and, possibly, a 
conspiracy. The first sentence features epistrophe, while the second 
features a different scheme of repetition, mesodiplosis, or 
repetition of words in the middle of a sentence. Unlike the previous 
example, which suggests a causal relationship, these evoke a shared 
affective sense that something is amiss. These appeals coincide with 
WWF’s increasing emphasis, rhetorically, on the potential health 
problems associated with consuming the “dirty” or “contaminated” 
water from affected wells. 
The examples included here are not particularly notable as 
rhetorical performances in the traditional sense. The people 
interviewed in these articles offer up examples from their personal 
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experience of how the wind turbines have affected water supply for 
them, their families, their pets, their livestock, and even their 
appliances. Yet their language is steeped in rhetorical figures and 
schemes. (With more space, we could go on to identify frequent use 
of rhetorical questions, adages drawn from the experiences of rural 
life, and other devices common to oral speech reflected in 
newspaper interviews.) 
Phrases linked by epistrophe allowed speakers to connect events, 
grammatically and logically, that might otherwise be considered 
random or disconnected. Repetition, more broadly, offers a 
resilient way to turn ambiguity in their favor, forging a resilient 
response to concerns that, to date, have not been resolved. 
Incrementum 
In her foundational book, Rhetorical Figures in Science, 
Fahnestock (2002) explains that an incrementum “expresses an 
ordered series, a series that goes somewhere,” one that typically 
ascends “from the bottom to the top of an accepted hierarchy” (p. 
92). Incrementum, she argues, can work in multiple ways: by 
implying that the items in the series “belong in the same category” 
(p. 95), “spanning the conceptual gap” between disparate items, 
“rhetorically lengthening” the space between items (p. 97), and 
“reduc[ing] the separation between groups” (p. 113). Fahnestock 
notes that incrementum is frequently used in biomedicine to, for 
instance, triage patients in the hospital (p. 95) and understand 
disabilities on a spectrum (p. 113). 
Accordingly, it makes sense that healthcare providers and 
researchers turn to pain scales to order, evaluate, and treat pain, a 
resilient embodied rhetorical phenomenon. Pain scales are visual-
verbal tools that primarily employ the figure of incrementum to 
“detect changes in pain with pain treatment or procedures known 
to produce pain” (Ferreira-Valente, Pais-Ribeiro, & Jensen, 2011, p. 
2399). To analyze these scales is to delve into the “biomedical 
backstage,” where the “material-discursive performance” of pain is 
turned into “manageable bits and bytes” (Teston, 2017, p. 171). Pain 
scales, then, do not merely represent pain. As we argue, even the 
commonly used Wong-Baker FACES Pain Scale, which was 
developed for children, opens patients and healthcare providers to 
arguments about what pain can be and might become. In this 
section, we examine how incrementum helps us understand the 
FACES Pain Scale and a number of alternative “rogue” pain scales. 
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As we will show, these rogue pain scales renegotiate the typical pain 
scale formation, present incomplete or overlapping series, or 
eschew series entirely, thereby turning the form of the traditional 
pain scale. As such, these alternative scales suggest that standard 
pain scales are not merely linear measurements: they turn patients 
and their healthcare providers toward new possibilities for 
understanding the felt experience of pain. 
Although anesthesia was first used in the mid-1800s, measuring 
pain did not become an American fascination until the end of 
World War II (Ball & Westhorpe, 2011, p. 529). The first visual 
analogue pain scale was developed in 1966, and it served as the 
inspiration for Dr. Donna Wong and Connie M. Baker’s Wong-
Baker FACES Pain scale, which they developed in the 1980s. They 
published the first version in 1988 and a revision in 1995 (Baker, 
2016). Wong and Baker contend that the scale was “drawn by 
children in pain who wanted to convey their suffering as quickly 
and meaningfully as possible” (p. 297). However, a meta-analysis 
suggests that it is now used with both adults and children 
(Tomlinson, von Baeyer, Stinson, & Sung, 2010, p. e1173). On the 
instruction sheet (see fig. 1), healthcare providers are told to select 
the term “hurt” or “pain”— “whichever seems right for a particular 
child”—and say 
These faces show how much something can hurt. This face 
[point to face on far left] shows no pain. The faces show more 
and more pain [point to each from left to right] up to this one 
[point to face on far right] - it shows very much pain. Point to 
the face that shows how much you hurt [right now]. 
 
Figure 1. Faces Pain Scale – Revised (FPS-R) ©2001, International 
Association for the Study of Pain. Available from www.iasp-pain.org/FPSR 
This scale shows a series of faces, starting with a seemingly 
neutral expression and climaxing with a final, agonized expression 
in which the person’s mouth is open as if they are screaming. The 
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final face’s forehead is wrinkled and their eyes are squeezed shut 
due to overwhelming misery. The description of the faces 
transitioning from showing no pain to “show[ing] more and more 
pain” is a traditional incrementum following an Anglo-European 
left-right processing pattern. Small features on the faces shift as the 
pain increases: the eyes move from open to squeezed shut, the 
forehead transitions from unwrinkled to wrinkled, and the mouth 
moves from a seemingly neutral half-smile to a scream. The scale 
persuades us to view pain as a bounded experience that increases at 
equal increments. It makes pain seem controllable and scalable, 
since there is a clear beginning and end to the pain experience. 
Notably, studies suggest that the most valuable aspect of the faces 
scale is seeing how scores change over time (Tomlinson et al., 2010, 
p. e1187). In all, in this scale, a person’s pain is rendered visible and 
quantifiable based on increasingly tormented facial expressions. 
Intriguingly, rogue pain scales trope on this scale to show how the 
embodied experience of pain is vastly different. For patients with 
chronic pain, the problems with this scale and its directions for use 
are obvious. The scale does not account for how people experience 
multiple types of pain in different places, how people experience 
pain differently, nor how people have learned to internalize pain. 
Thus, patients with both chronic and acute pain conditions have 
taken to creating their own pain scales. These scales, which are 
circulated on social media sites in the form of memes and graphics, 
show how traditional linear, unambiguous pain scales invalidate 
their nonlinear, ambiguous experiences of living with pain. These 
alternative scales more clearly express the resilience of pain in its 
multiplicity—its varying types, locations, triggers, and contexts. 
Notably, many of these “rogue” pain scales renegotiate the typical 
pain scale formation, present incomplete or overlapping series, or 
eschew series entirely, thereby shifting the form of the pain scale to 
better reflect the individual and somewhat ineffable experience of 
experiencing pain. Alternative pain scales generally do not have a 
clear author nor origin. Accordingly, we chose to focus on two series 
that are most clearly troping on the Wong-Baker FACES Pain Scale: 
the so-called “Improved Pain Scale” and the “Fibro Bunny” series, 
both of which examine the qualitative changes in felt pain. 
The so-called “Improved Pain Scale” highlights the inadequacy of 
the FACES and other common pain scales (see fig. 2). While the 
scale still functions incrementally, with the numeric scale imposing 
and regulating an incrementum, each increment is a vastly different 
unit of measure. The “Improved Pain Scale” begins at 1 and ends at 
 
 
 
Abeles 10  Poroi 15,1 (January 2020) 
Jack 
Singer 
10, but it is presented in two vertical columns, which makes the 
items appear less closely connected. The phrasing of the first item, 
“It might be an itch,” suggests that it is unclear if a person is 
experiencing pain, and if so, what kind of pain. This is different 
from the FACES scale, which begins with “no pain” and does not 
specify any particular pain sensations (such as itching or burning, 
or as this scale later describes, bee stings). Questions about the 
existence and type of pain persist through item 5. From there, the 
distance between each item increases exponentially—from “Bees!” 
to “I can’t move it hurts so bad” to “Mauled by a bear or ninjas.” 
The scale ends with “unconscious,” implying that a person is no 
longer capable of rating their pain. In this scale, both the 
quantitative measures and qualitative types of pain are increasing. 
Because the images do not show the same kind of overall iconic 
progression, they better represent the unpredictable yet persistent 
experience of living with pain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. “Improved Pain Scale.” Unknown Author. Available from 
https://www.reddit.com/r/nursing/comments/6y4iia/an_improved_pain_scale/
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The “Fibro Bunny” pain scale, in contrast, shows how individuals 
can further turn the original pain scale toward one that addresses 
embodied pain experiences. This scale tropes on the Wong-Baker 
Pain Scale to better represent the experience of living with 
fibromyalgia, an ambiguous chronic illness thought to be caused by 
overactive nerves. There is not yet a meaningful diagnostic test for 
this condition and its symptoms range from widespread 
musculoskeletal pain to cognitive difficulties. Accordingly, the so-
called “Fibro Bunny” eschews a linear scale. Instead, to 
demonstrate the limits of incrementum, it uses a chart format to 
document the different types of pain—ranging from no discomfort 
to agony—that fibromyalgia patients experience. The creator(s) use 
colors and short captions to visually and verbally explain the 
intricacies of fibromyalgia. 
The chart begins with “What is pain? I feel great!” and a 
seemingly happy bunny surrounded by sparkly bursts, implying 
positivity and energy. If read left to right or top to bottom, the 
bunnies depict varying types of pain and illness related to 
fibromyalgia. However, one symptom does not necessarily cause 
another. For example, the third bunny’s caption, “I’m feeling some 
pain in my head. NOT COOL MAN!,” is followed by another bunny, 
captioned, “Why am I so exhausted?” Although, plausibly, head 
pain could contribute to exhaustion, it usually does not cause it. 
Some units on the scale, however, are positioned in a more linear 
fashion. For example, the “Why am I so exhausted?” bunny comes 
before the “I feel like I could sleep for five days!!!” bunny. As a 
result, the scale ends with a bunny that has fire in its eyes, posed 
with an upturned, tight fist, saying “Did someone just set my body 
on fire? Sh*t just got real! HELP!” For fibromyalgia patients who 
transition between these different levels of pain on a daily basis, 
this bunny may represent a climax in their pain, but more likely, a 
buildup of exhaustion and frustration about experiencing pain that 
eventually boils over. 
With these pain scales, patients turn the original scale toward a 
version that humorously validates patients’ embodied experiences. 
Pain itself is resilient and has, to adopt Stormer and McGreavy’s 
terms, “capacitated” others in the rhetorical ecology of pain 
management to trope on traditional pain scales as a means of 
understanding, representing, and clarifying their felt sense of pain. 
Instead of rejecting the pain scales entirely, users further develop 
them to better meet the needs of their evolving environments, 
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allowing patients to rearticulate their felt experiences of pain. 
Accordingly, rogue pain scales are not simply linguistic critiques of 
pain descriptors; they are, instead, indicative of the ways that 
rhetorical ecologies are always open to troping. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. “The Fibro Bunny.” Unknown Author. Available from 
https://pin.it/pa6z7asic57lzu. 
Metonymy 
Thus far our analyses of stylistic turnings highlight ways rhetors 
can leverage language’s material arrangement to resiliently turn 
and transform rhetorical engagement. In the next section, we 
approach material-semiotic resilience from the other direction, 
showing how a material transformation is equally appreciable as a 
linguistic and conceptual turning of one thing into another. 
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We do this by focusing on metonymy, a trope that has not 
received much attention in rhetorical analyses of science. Yet in his 
classic essay “Four master tropes” (1941), Kenneth Burke argued 
that science is decidedly metonymic because of its predilection for 
turning phenomenal effects into material causes (as when, in a 
poetic sense, we metonymically refer to love as “the heart” or, in a 
scientific vein, reduce love to the action of neurochemistry). As a 
discipline, Burke asserted, science’s ideology goes beyond merely 
ascertaining correlation to advance reductive, causal, metonymic 
substitutions. Perhaps this is why Burke’s description of science’s 
metonymic disciplinarity has generally gone unremarked; the 
reduction of phenomenal effect to material cause is so central to 
scientific ideology that we often accept it without realizing it is a 
rhetorical, metonymic turning of one thing to another. Burke’s 
attention was directed toward the kind of “basic science” that is 
principally concerned with studying material causes, and it’s quite 
possible his observation still holds true in that regard. Yet much of 
the recent work in science studies suggests science is as much a 
project of technological fabrication as it is a practice of knowledge 
construction. While scientists are still motivated by the causal 
ideology Burke identified, they are likewise invested in fabricating 
technologies that allow them to instrumentalize causes. In this 
section, we explore technoscientific rhetoricity using Burke’s 
method of tracing science’s metonymic transformations.  
As a case study, we trace important turns in the metonymic 
development of one of biology’s most heralded technological 
advances, CRISPR/Cas9 genetic engineering (hereon referred to as 
CRISPR). We argue CRISPR technoscience was advanced by 
metonymic turnings in which scientists gradually reimagined 
CRISPR agents as technological instruments (as when we 
metonymically refer to journalists, the agents of journalism, by 
their paradigmatic instrument, calling them “the press”). 
Metonymies are tropes in which the close association of two entities 
(like agent and instrument) allow one to be substituted for the 
other. This same metonymic logic of close association made 
CRISPR’s invention possible, as every indication of CRISPR’s own 
power could be troped as a potential instrument. Thus, what 
advanced and invented CRISPR technoscience is a kind of 
metonymic resilience in which CRISPR’s agency could be turned 
into an instrument. 
Making this case requires a brief précis on what CRISPR is, for 
though it is best known as genetic engineering technology, that is 
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not its only form, nor its primary one. In the first instance, CRISPR 
is actually a naturally occurring bacterial immune system capable of 
rewriting bacterial genes in response to viral infections. Identifying 
CRISPR as a natural genetic agent was a radical discovery for 
microbiologists. For whereas classical genetics generally holds that 
a species’ genome determines its traits, CRISPR offers evidence that 
organismal traits (in this case the CRISPR system) can determine 
genomes. As a number of bacteriologists suggest, this makes 
CRISPR an agent of Lamarckian evolution by acquired 
characteristics, as opposed to neo-Darwinian evolution by genetic 
mutation and natural selection. It took a number of years for 
bacteriologists to understand that CRISPR was agentially causing 
evolutionary change by rewriting genes, but as this became 
apparent, evidence of CRISPR’s agency was resiliently, 
metonymically troped as evidence it could be turned into an 
instrument. 
Take, for example, one of the pivotal early studies of CRISPR led 
by Rodolphe Barrangou (2007) in which the potential to 
metonymically turn CRISPR from agent to instrument was an 
underlying motivation. Though the study’s avowed purpose was 
simply to understand CRISPR’s biochemical actions, the scientists 
also made clear they believed CRISPR’s agency might be 
instrumentalizable. In this regard, it is important to note that 
Barrangou’s research team was largely employed by Danisco, a food 
conglomerate that developed bacterial cultures for the dairy 
industry. Danisco’s cultured bacteria were frequently killed by the 
same viral infections that harm wild bacteria. The researchers 
believed that understanding CRISPR’s evolutionary agency—its 
ability to evolve bacteria with viral immunities—might bring them 
closer to developing CRISPR-based technology that could provide 
similar antiviral immunities (Barrangou et al., 2007, p. 1709-1710). 
As Burke (1969) might say, these scientists were doing more than 
merely describing nature in “scenic” terms (p. 41); their research 
was motivated by a metonymic inclination to turn CRISPR from a 
natural evolutionary agent into a genetic engineering instrument. 
The scientists themselves acknowledged this in their conclusion. 
They first pointed out that their research tended to confirm that 
CRISPR is an agent of genetic evolutionary change, writing that 
because CRISPR alters bacterial genomes in response to hostile 
viruses, “it likely plays a significant role in [bacterial] evolution…” 
(Barrangou et al., 2007, p. 1711). Then they immediately suggested 
that this evolutionary agent could be instrumentalized. They wrote 
that because CRISPR evolves bacteria in response to viruses, it 
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“may accordingly be exploited as a virus defense mechanism and 
also potentially used to reduce the dissemination of mobile genetic 
elements [other deleterious genetic infections]…” (Barrangou et al., 
2007, p. 1711-1712). It is precisely because of CRISPR’s evolutionary 
agency that it “may accordingly be exploited” and “potentially used” 
as an instrument. Such inventional rhetoric demonstrates a 
metonymic troping in which an openness to CRISPR’s agency helps 
scientists to begin resiliently thinking about it as a tool. 
Such resilience marked a number of other CRISPR-related 
scientific advances. One of these was reported by Makarova, 
Grishin, Shabalina, Wolf, & Koonin (2006), who were the first to 
explicitly suggest CRISPR might cause Lamarckian evolution. They 
postulated this theory in their conclusion, writing, “Interestingly, as 
a mechanism of inheritance of acquired traits, CASS seems to come 
closest to a true Lamarckian mode of evolution among all known 
systems of heredity” (Makarova et al., 2006, p. 16). Then, just like 
Barrangou et al., they quickly followed this description of 
evolutionary agency with the suggestion that such agency could be 
instrumentalized. They write that CRISPR’s ability to rewrite 
genetic code could be “exploited to silence any gene in organisms 
that encode [the CRISPR system]” (Makarova et al., 2006, p. 17). 
Again, it is because CRISPR naturally acts on genetic texts that 
these scientists can resiliently reimagine it as a potential genetic 
engineering technology. In a sentence following that suggestion, 
Makarova et al. went so far as to propose that constructing such 
technology might even be “simple,” given that the capacity for 
acting on genetic texts already exists within natural CRISPR 
systems (p. 17). Describing the transformation from agent to 
instrument as “simple” leverages the same logic of close association 
that undergirds the agent-instrument metonymic pairing. Since 
agency and instrumentality are, metonymically, so closely 
associated,1 the movement from one metonymic state to the other 
 
1 Though Burke generally equates “agency” with instrumentality, we use 
it here to describe the causal capacities of agents. Interestingly, the 
multiple meanings of the words “agency” may be the result of the same 
metonymic logic that closely associates agent and instrument. The Oxford 
English Dictionary notes that the word “agency” can be used to refer to 
either the capacity for action, the instrument of an actor, or the actor itself 
(“agency, n.”). Undergirding what seems like lexical ambiguity might be a 
very reasonable metonymic tendency to closely associate and substitute 
agents, their causal capacities, and instruments. 
 
 
 
Abeles 
Jack 
Singer 16  Poroi 15,1 (January 2020) 
could be, conceptually, quite “simple.” That CRISPR is a natural 
evolutionary agent is no obstruction to it also being inventionally 
turned into an engineering instrument. By being open to CRISPR’s 
agency, these scientists were able to resiliently conceive its 
instrumentality. 
By 2012, predictions of CRISPR’s metonymic utility proved true. 
A group of researchers led by Doudna and Charpentier identified 
the molecular modifications required to let biochemists turn 
CRISPR from evolutionary agent into genetic technology. Their 
discovery, as they put it, was that “[the CRISPR system’s cutting 
enzyme] can be programmed … to target and cleave any [genetic] 
sequence of interest” (Jinek et al., 2012, p. 820). Significantly, the 
use of the word “can” makes Cas9’s metonymic transition from 
natural actor to “programmed” instrument a substitutional 
possibility compatible with the wild CRISPR’s agency. Agency is not 
seen in opposition to instrumentality. Instead, a metonymic logic 
undergirds the potential for turning one material state into the 
other. 
Doudna and Charpentier understood that their work prepared 
future researchers to better metonymize CRISPR’s agency as an 
instrument. They made this observation two years after they 
published their initial findings, in a 2014 essay in Science: 
“Following [our] 2012 publication of Jinek et al., three 
[subsequent] studies … demonstrated that CRISPR-Cas9 
represents an efficient tool to edit the genomes of cells” (Doudna & 
Charpentier, p. 1258096-4; our emphasis). Doudna and 
Charpentier had laid the foundation for CRISPR systems to 
“represent” something new. Representation can, of course, occur 
via any number of tropes, but a representational substitution that 
leverages the close association between agent and instrument is 
metonymic. 
Doudna and Charpentier were correct that CRISPR’s metonymic 
instrumentality became a motivation for subsequent study. What 
had once been a fascinating example of a natural evolutionary agent 
was increasingly metonymized as a biotechnical tool. Indeed, 
CRISPR’s metonymization became so established that even natural 
bacterial CRISPRs were increasingly thought of as technologies. So, 
for example, when a group of M.I.T. researchers published 
groundbreaking work on using CRISPR tools to genetically 
engineer mice, the first sentence of their report begins with a 
metonymy in which the natural agent is depicted as inherently 
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technological. They write that “The … bacterial CRISPR/Cas system 
is a novel genome- engineering technology...” (Yang et al. 2013, p. 
1370). That the authors acknowledge CRISPR is a natural bacterial 
system in no way impedes their ability to say that natural system 
“is” a “technology.” This metonymic logic had been so well 
established in preceding technoscientific inventions that it was now 
common sense. 
This prominence of metonymic invention does not rule out the 
possibility that CRISPR might also be articulated through other 
tropes and figures. Previous research notes the prevalence of 
“editing” and “textual” metaphors surrounding CRISPR 
technologies, as the technology allows researchers to rewrite and 
revise genetic “texts” (O’Keefe, Perrault, Halpern, Ikemoto, & 
Yarborough, 2015, p. 7). Others rightly point to metaphors that 
describe CRISPR as a genetic “scalpel” (Nelson, Yu, & Ceccarelli, 
2015, p. 60). All these may be operative in CRISPR discourses, yet 
attending to a technoscience’s metonymic invention can be just as 
important for assessing its motivations and capacities. What we see 
in this study is that a specific metonymic turning, instrument for 
agent, can describe how this technoscience conceives its own 
capacities for change. 
Conclusion: Tropes/Figures as a Resilient Path 
for Researchers in RSTM 
We will conclude by briefly suggesting how our framework may be 
applied and extended to other topics and how this understanding of 
tropes and figures may align with other research trajectories in 
RSTM. 
Cognitive approaches to tropes and figures stress the interiority of 
schemes and tropes as mental patterns. In a 2018 article, Harris 
and his co-authors remind us that rhetorical figures are “cognitively 
moulded linguistic devices that serve functional, mnemonic, and 
aesthetic purposes” (p. 155). As Harris, Di Marco, Ruan, and 
O’Reilly (2018) develop tools that can code figures, they can help us 
understand how figures overlap within and across texts, genres, and 
authors (p. 164). We might suggest, however, that cognitive 
approaches could profitably engage models of the “embodied” or 
even “ecological” brain. For instance, a child practicing a new word 
(as one author’s son did recently, practicing the word “dinosaurio” 
every night before bed) is not only engaging in repetition 
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cognitively but also physically (in this case, trying repeatedly to 
articulate the Spanish “r” sound with his lips and tongue). Such 
repetitions can engage embodied actions or even material ones (for 
instance, while playing with a dinosaur toy). 
In fact, children’s development is an excellent example of the 
broader tendency for figures to emerge through material 
engagements. Within rhetorical studies, little research examines 
how human children develop tropic and figural expression. As in 
other species, children develop rhetorical abilities through figures 
such as hyperbole, repetition, and metonymy. (Consider how much 
an infant cries—and soon learns to do so hyperbolically and 
repetitively—“turning” crying into a metonym for food or any 
number of needs). Children’s play involves various material-
semiotic representations: “Both pretend play and language involve 
symbolic representation. In language, sound represents objects, 
actions, attributes, and situations. In play, children use objects and 
actions, as well as language, to stand for other things” (Christie & 
Roskos, 2006, p. 8). Children’s imaginative play often involves 
metaphorically “turning” one object into another—a wooden block 
becomes a telephone; a stick becomes a sword. For children, a 
firefighter hat metonymically turns one into a firefighter. Early 
literacy researchers argue that these actions lay the groundwork for 
literacy (Christie & Roskos, 2006). Yet, little overlap exists between 
RSTM focused inquiries and scholarship in linguistics, speech and 
hearing sciences, or other fields that could inform these 
investigations. We might note Harris’ work (2013) as a key 
exception, as well as (on the other end of the developmental 
spectrum) his piece in this issue. 
Extending this research on the development of tropes and figures, 
scholars in RSTM might profitably engage research on animal and 
plant rhetorics. Kennedy (1992) speculates about a range of figures 
and tropes through which animals communicate (either with each 
other or with other species). He gives the example of animal 
communication via metonymy: “though none of my dogs has ever 
brought me his leash to suggest going on a walk, when I take the 
leash in hand, they become excited and know exactly what it 
signifies” (Kennedy, p. 19-20). He also describes the “inclination to 
hyperbole” among many animals, such as the exaggerated 
posturing or growling animals use in mating rituals or in 
establishing hierarchies (Kennedy, p. 19). The goal of this approach 
would not involve simply cataloging the various tropes and schemes 
present in animal communication, but, inspired by rhetoric’s 
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current material turn, to attend to the ecologies within which tropes 
can allow for resilient “turning” between/among/across species. 
Exploring such acts as instances of tropological or figurative 
rhetoric would entail investigating “qualities of relations between 
entities, not just among humans, that enable different modes of 
rhetoric to emerge, flourish, and dissipate” (Stormer & McGreavy, 
2017, p. 3). To take one specific example, hermit crabs’ 
chemosensory systems attune them via scent to predation sites for 
other species (such as snails), where they can find a good source of 
food (carrion) or empty shells to inhabit. Research suggests that 
crabs can identify scents specific to both carrion availability and 
shell availability, suggesting a metonymic relationship where the 
scent in question orients or turns the hermit crab to a specific 
resource (Laidre & Greggor, 2015, p. 970). In this instance, the 
hermit crab exhibits something of the same metonymic sensibility 
that Burke identified in scientists: an ability to substitute an 
odoriferous effect for its material cause. Scholars trained in RSTM 
are poised to pursue such explorations by engaging critically with 
scientific literature and collaborating with ecologists and zoologists 
on problems of mutual interest. 
We have argued throughout this essay that tropes and figures 
offer rhetorical resources that lend specificity to investigations of 
resilient material-semiotic relations among and across different 
ecologies. The rich catalog of rhetorical figures offers many avenues 
for future investigation. This can include not just the list of those 
things that are most technically defined as tropes but any figurative 
device that turns language beyond its most literal or 
straightforward use. In this way, rhetoric’s long commitment to 
moving language beyond the literal can also be seen as a broader 
effort to study and invent resilient turns. 
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